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INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL
problem of unjustified delay, began an inquiry that may have further
constitutional implications. Unjustified delay before arrest may
come to be forbidden as a violation of due process under the fifth
or the fourteenth amendment just as such delay between arrest and
trial is now forbidden by the sixth amendment.
Ross v. United States lacks the clarity necessary -to preserve
certainty in the law. Though the objectives of the court could
better be achieved by relying upon a ground other than delay, law
enforcement agencies should heed the warning that the statute of
limitations is not inviolate if it appears that prosecution was un-
justifiably delayed.
GEORGE CARSON, II
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Incompetence of Defense Counsel
The petitioner in Schaber v. Maxwell' was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death. At arraignment the presiding judge had
entered an oral plea of not guilty on his behalf. Petitioner waived
trial by jury, electing to be tried by a three-judge state court.2
At the trial, the attorneys appointed to represent petitioner had
virtually conceded that he was guilty of the acts alleged and, through
their opening statement, indicated that they were relying solely upon
the defense of insanity; yet they failed to enter a written plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity required by Ohio law, without
which the accused is conclusively presumed to have been sane at the
time of the commission of the alleged offense.3 After conviction
and sentence, petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the
federal district court alleging that counsel's failure to comply with
the Ohio statute constituted incompetence and thus deprived him
of effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by due process of law."
'348 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965).
'OHiO REv. CODE ANNO. 2945.05 to -.06 (Page 1954).
' "A defendant who does not plead not guilty by reason of insanity is
conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time of the commission of
the offense charged." OHIo REv. CODE ANNo. § 2943.03 (E) (Page 1954).
Section 2943.04 provides that all pleas other than guilty or not guilty shall
be in writing, subscribed by defendant or his counsel, and shall immediately
be entered upon the court record.
'Petitioner had exhausted his remedies in the state courts of Ohio. The
Supreme Court of Ohio denied a petition for habeas corpus on the grounds
that incompetence of counsel was a matter which must be raised on appeal.
Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664, 667 n.3 (6th Cir. 1965).
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The district court denied the application for the writ on the ground
that the oral plea of insanity had in fact been accepted by the trial
court. On petitioner's appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, it was held that the trial court did not accept
the oral plea; consequently there had been no adjudication of peti-
tioner's sanity.
In reversing petitioner's conviction the court held that
under the facts and circumstances of this case we are of the
opinion that petitioner was deprived of due process of law at his
trial in the state court.... because of the failure of his counsel to
file a written plea of 'not guilty by reason of insanity' and the
conclusive presumption of sanity in the absence of a written
plea.5
The right to counsel as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth
amendments means effective assistance of counsel in the prepara-
tion of the accused's case." The term "effective assistance of coun-
sel" is generally used in two different senses. In a procedural sense,
there must be timely assignment of counsel to allow an opportunity
to prepare an adequate defense.7 In addition courts use the term
"effective assistance of counsel" in the sense of the quality of the
defense actually rendered.' The principal case well demonstrates the
problems created by claims of ineffective assistance of counsel pred-
Id. at 673.
'E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). A distinction must be made between those
cases where there is a denial of the right to counsel and those cases where
there was representation by counsel, but for some reason the representation
was ineffective or inadequate.
'The concept of effective assistance of counsel is used to describe a
procedural requirement, i.e., that assignment of counsel be effective to allow
useful participation in the preparation and trial of the defendant's case. See,
e.g., Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945) (assignment must be timely made
to allow preparation); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940) (denial of
consultation privilege makes appointment a sham); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932) (appointment of entire county bar not effective).
' The term effective assistance is used to evaluate the quality of the
defense representation rendered. When the defendant attacks his conviction
alleging that trial counsel had a conflict of interests, the substance of the
attack would seem to be that the conflict of interests lowered the quality of
the representation rendered. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60(1942) (accused's defense rendered less effective). But see Mitchell v. United
States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958) (pro-
cedural requirement, not quality of defense rendered). See generally Waltz,
Inadequacy of Trial Defdnse Representation as a Ground for Post-Convic-
tion Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289 (1964).
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icated upon charges that defense counsel in a criminal case was in-
competent.9
The Supreme Court has never undertaken to establish a standard
of quality for defense counsel in criminal cases, but the lower
federal and the state courts have enunciated various standards of
quality required by the Constitution."0 It would seem that to sub-
stantiate a claim of incompetence, the defendant must allege acts
or omissions by counsel that are the result of insufficient knowledge
of the law or facts of the case. A decision by counsel when he
lacks a sufficient knowledge of the facts or law of the case that a
reasonable inquiry would have produced is manifestly incompetent.11
In Turner v. Maryland' defense counsel apparently made no in-
vestigation of the facts or law involved in the case. The defendant's
conviction was reversed because appearance without study or prepa-
ration for useful participation in the trial is not a satisfaction of
the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. In
Application of Tomich13 the defendant was convicted on the basis
of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure because counsel
failed to make a pre-trial motion to suppress as required by state
law. The court held that the mistake of counsel required "the find-
ing that petitioner was without the 'effective' assistance of counsel
that is guaranteed by the Constitution." '14 The defendants in Lunce
v. Overlade'5 were represented by counsel who was completely un-
acquainted with the law of the jurisdiction. Counsel did not chal-
lenge the sufficiency of the affidavit, which apparently did not charge
the crime for which the defendants were tried and convicted; further-
more, he failed to save his exceptions. In reversing the conviction,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held, that "the record
made by Ohio counsel in his defense of petitioners irrefutably
demonstrates that he was so ignorant of Indiana law and procedure
'See generally, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 1434 (1965); 49 VA. L. REv. 1531(1963).10E.g., Pineda v. Bailey, 340 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1965) (defense with
zeal); Hickock v. Crouse, 334 F.2d 95 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 982 (1965) (defense with all counsel's skill); Willis v. Hunter, 166
F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 848 (1948) (defense by
able lawyer).
" Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 978 (1963).
12303 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962).
1221 F. Supp. 500 (D. Mont. 1963), aff'd 332 F.2d 987 (1964).
1 id. at 505.
"244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
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that it was virtually impossible for him to protect or even to assert
petitioners' rights."' 6 Defense counsel in Poe v. United States
17
advised the defendant not to take the witness stand because counsel
believed certain statements by the defendant could be used to im-
peach him. In fact, the statements were inadmissible and could not
have been so used. The district court for the District of Columbia
in reversing the conviction said, "where the defense is substantially
weakened because of the unawareness on the part of defense counsel
of a rule of law basic to the case, the accused is not given the
effective representation guaranteed him by the Constitution.' 18
Petitioner's allegation of incompetence in Scliaber v. Maxwell would
seem to come within this category. Counsel elected to rely on the
defense of insanity, but did not have an adequate knowledge of the
applicable state law, with the result that petitioner was conclusively
presumed to be sane.
Courts are generally reluctant to allow claims charging that
counsel was incompetent.' 9 There is a presumption that counsel is
effective and competent,2 ° and mere general criticism of the at-
torney's conduct is insufficient to substantiate a claim of incompe-
tence. The defendant must allege with particularity the acts or omis-
sions alleged to constitute incompetence. 2 ' This burden is further
complicated by the general proposition that acts of counsel involving
judgment or trial strategy cannot be asserted as incompetence. 22
10Id. at 110.17233 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1964).
18 Id. at 178.
" See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 267 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 889 (1959) (petition fabricated with aid of cell-mates).
20 Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955).2 1E.g., Gilpin v. United States, 252 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1958) (allega-
tion of general incompetence insufficient); United States ex rel. Weber v.
Ragen, 176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 809 (1949)
(allegation of old age insufficient) ; United States v. Helwig, 159 F.2d 616(3d Cir. 1947) (allegation of inexperience not sufficient).
"2The acts of counsel that are considered to be within the ambit of
counsel's judgment are too numerous to be listed here. See, e.g., Johnson
v. United States, 333 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964) (failure to object to illegal
confession); Tompa v. Virginia ex rel. Cunningham, 331 F.2d 552 (4th
Cir. 1964) (failure to call particular witnesses); Rivera v. United States,
318 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1963) (failure to request bill of particulars); Snead
v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959) (failure to object to jury instruc-
tions); United States v. Duhart, 269 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1959) (failure to
use one of several available defenses); Sweet v. Howard, 155 F.2d 715(7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 950 (1949) (failure to seek change
of venue); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 889 (1945) (advice to plead guilty).
INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL
However, where counsel makes several erroneous decisions in trial
tactics that result in a total failure to present the cause of the accused,
courts will find that degree of incompetence necessary to constitute
a violation of due process.13 For example, election between various
available defenses is normally considered a matter of trial strategy,
but where the defense actually rendered is highly insubstantial in
relation to those not offered, doubt will be cast on the hypothesis
that counsel made a competent and intelligent choice.24 Thus, in
general it is said that a tactical decision by counsel, to come within
the immunity referred to above, must be based on an informed pro-
fessional opinion.25 In addition, the convicted defendant must show
prejudice resulting from counsel's incompetence or demonstrate the
result of the trial might have been different except for the incom-
petent conduct.26 Some courts apparently extend the burden of
proof even further and require the defendant to prove that coun-
sel's conduct was so incompetent that it amounted to a breach of
counsel's duty to represent faithfully his clientY.1 In any event the
defendant must prove the incompetence of counsel made the trial
a sham,28 a farce or mockery of justice,29 or the equivalent of no
defense at all."0 In short the defendant must prove an extreme case.
" For example, where defense counsel failed to object to a coerced con-
fession, failed to use certain witnesses, and offered no evidence, the court
found incompetence that violated due process. Each of these could be con-
sidered a tactical decision, but the aggregate of the decisions constituted a
total failure to present the cause of the accused. Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d
14 (D.C. Cir. 1945).24 E.g., Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 978 (1963).
"For example, the decision not to argue the case to the jury would
normally be a matter of trial tactics, but where the decision is the result
of counsel's determination that his conscience would not allow him to argue
the case, the court will find incompetency constituting a denial of due
process. Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959).
"E.g., United States v. Duhart, 269 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1959); Ander-
son v. Bannan, 250 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1958) (per curiam); DuBoise v.
North Carolina, 225 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd, 338 F.2d 697 (4th
Cir. 1964).
'" E.g., Bouchard v. United States, 344 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1965), Ken-
nedy v. United States, 259 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
994 (1959).
" E.g., United States ex rel. Mitchell v. Thompson, 56 F. Supp. 683
(S.D.N.Y. 1944).
"E.g., Rivera v. United States, 318 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1963) ; O'Malley
v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Wight,
176 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1949).
" E.g., Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962); Lunce v.
Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
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In considering claims of incompetent counsel, some courts draw
a distinction between retained and appointed counsel.8" The major-
ity of courts recognizing the distinction hold that ineptness and
incompetency of the retained attorney is imputed to the defendant
and the client is bound by the acts of the attorney unless he re-
pudiates them in open court." However, those courts that base the
distinction on the agency rationale recognize that the rule has no
application when it is made to appear that the defendant is unac-
quainted with criminal procedure and is ignorant of his rights.
83
It would seem there is little valid basis for the rule since the excep-
tion should apply in almost every instance. Even the intelligent and
educated laymen will have only limited skill in the science of law and
the intricacies of criminal procedure. Some courts refuse relief
where counsel is retained, on the theory that incompetent acts of
retained counsel are not state action and thus there is no violation
of the fourteenth amendment.84 But when the incompetence of the
attorney results in an unfair trial, it would seem that the trial and
the subsequent conviction constitute sufficient state action within the
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment.85
Regardless of whether counsel is appointed or retained, courts
considering claims of incompetence are confronted with the same
basic problems. In both situations, the ultimate consideration is
whether the acts of counsel deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
The standards applied by the courts should assure relief in those
cases where counsel's incompetence has resulted in a substantial
failure to present the accused's case. Every court considering claims
of incompetence is confronted with the difficult task of determining
how many errors counsel can make in a case before the defendant
is deprived of a fair trial." By its very nature, this must be an
"
1 E.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953); Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95
(6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945); Ex parte Haumesch, 82
F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1936); See, Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1390 (1960).
" E.g., Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 869 (1945).
"Id. at 98.
"E.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d. Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953).
" It is well understood that private acts do not violate the fourteenth
amendment, but where the state judicial machinery adds impetus to that con-
duct, there is state action sufficient to violate the fourteenth amendment.
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
" Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 889 (1945).
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ad hoc determination with a consideration of the facts and circum-
stances in each case. While the courts must assure relief in those
cases where there has been a denial of the effective assistance of
counsel, they also must attempt to provide a solution that will avoid
burdening the courts with full-scale hearings on frivolous and in-
adequately supported claims of incompetence."7
The reviewing courts must judge counsel's conduct by some ex-
ternal, standard. If the convicted defendant alleges that counsel
made an error of law, the courts can more objectively determine if
the conduct was incompetent. However, when the defendant alleges
counsel made an error in trial tactics, as is most frequently the
case, the courts are required to apply a highly subjective test and
view counsel's conduct retrospectively. By its very nature, advocacy
is an art that is difficult to appraise. For the present, it would seem
that the fair trial standard, coupled with the requirements of alleg-
ing particular acts and showing prejudice, is the most satisfactory
solution. It would seem that where counsel has committed a clear
error of law, the defendant will have little difficulty in alleging the
particular act and proving resulting prejudice. 8  The courts should
continue to apply rigid standards in attacks on counsel's tactics and
judgment. The best trial lawyers often disagree on the proper
strategy for a given case, and this variance of views on profes-
sional technique should not be deemed incompetence. It has been
suggested that in any case where the trial judge is aware that coun-
sel is conducting the trial in an incompetent manner, he should permit
substitution of counsel and declare a mistrial if the defendant so
desires.39 However, it would seem more desirable for the court to
87 For example, one convict alleged his trial counsel was incompetent
because counsel was delinquent in payment of his State Bar dues at the
time of trial. White v. Beto, 322 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 925 (1964).
" It can be argued that the requirements of alleging particular acts of
incompetence and showing prejudice place an undue burden on the incar-
cerated prisoner who frequently drafts his on petition for post-conviction
relief. However, the indigent defendant will usually have access to the
assistance of appointed counsel on request. See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial
Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal
Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rv. 289, 296 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-220(1965) (providing for counsel to indigents proceeding under post-convic-
tion statute).
,Lumbard, The Adequacy of Lawyers Now in Criminal Practice, 47J. Amd. JUD. Soc'y 176, 181 (1964). But see United States ex rel. Darcy
v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953)
(indicating such intervention might be a violation of the defendant's right
to develop his defense).
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advise counsel of his mistakes and allow a recess for counsel to
correct his errors. For example, in the Schaber case, the court said:
"[I]n this case the mistake of counsel in a sense may have been
induced by the failure of the trial court to indicate in any way that
"140a written plea was necessary ... .
Incompetence charges have a potentially detrimental effect on
counsel. In those cases where the charge is sustained, counsel's
professional reputation suffers even though his performance in the
case may be no indication of his general level of professional capac-
ity. Even where the charge of incompetence is unsupported, counsel
may be professionally embarrassed and inconvenienced by the neces-
sity of appearing in court to defend his actions. The courts there-
fore recognize that in addition to their duty to protect an accused
from an unfair trial, they also have a duty to protect lawyers from
unwarranted claims of incompetence. 41 Courts are fearful that fre-
quent claims of incompetence will make lawyers reluctant to enter the
criminal bar or accept court assignments.42 The threat of charges
of incompetence may deter counsel from taking those calculated risks
that are normally equated with good advocacy.
The ultimate solution to alleviating the problems raised by claims
of incompetent counsel may lie with the organized bar. There is
general recognition that the criminal bar is inadequate for the de-
manding task of properly representing criminal defendants, partic-
ularly indigents.4 3 The public tends to disparage the criminal law-
yer, which may explain the reluctance of members of the bar to enter
criminal work to any extent greater than absolutely necessary."
Bar associations should expend every effort to increase the status
of the -criminal bar in the view of the public and the profession.
Only when there is an ample number of qualified members of the
bar, interested and participating in criminal defense, can the supply
of competent counsel meet the needs of the accused defendants for
40 348 F.2d 664, 673 (6th Cir. 1965).
'
1 E.g., DuBoise v. North Carolina, 225 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd,
338 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1964). The courts generally recognize that an
attack on the attorney's competence waives the attorney-client privilege and
will permit counsel to defend his actions and testify as to understandings
reached between counsel and client. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 167
F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Va. 1957), aff'd, 260 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1958).
,2 Gray v. United States, 299 F.2d 467, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"Lumbard, The Adequacy of Lawyers Now in Criminal Practice, 47
J. Am. JTD. Soc'Y 176 (1964).
"Id. at 179-80.
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adequate representation. In the majority of cases the erring lawyer
is reputable and professionally competent; he has merely committed
error that made him ineffective in the disputed case. It would seem
obvious that disciplinary action is warranted only if the perfor-
mance of the attorney is such that it reflects on the integrity of
the profession. Assuming that decisions in recent years are indica-
tive of the trend, courts will become more objective and more de-
manding as to the quality of representation required by the Consti-
tution. The organized bar should begin now to take steps that will
aid the courts in formulating an adequate and workable standard.
The efforts of the bar have been highly successful in solving prob-
lems for providing counsel to indigent defendants. It can be as-
sumed that they will be successful in devising objective standards
in evaluating the defense rendered in a given case.
DAviD S. ORCUTT
Constitutional Law-Religious Segregation of Public Schools-The
Wearing of Distinctive Religious Garb by Public School Teachers
While Teaching
In Moore v. Board of Educ.1 a parent-taxpayer sought a declar-
atory judgment to the effect that defendant school board's method
of operating three of the schools in the district violated the first
amendment and Ohio constitutional prohibitions2 against the estab-
lishment of religion. Also, a declaratory judgment was sought
against the placement plan, the effect of which was to create three
schools totally Catholic and one predominantly non-Catholic, on the
ground that it was a denial of equal protection of the law under the
fourteenth amendment as applied in Brown v. Board of Educ.3
Prayer for an injunction to prohibit these practices was joined with
the request for declaratory relief. The plaintiff further sought an
injunction against the, wearing of religious garb by nuns while
teaching in public schools on the ground that it introduced sectarian-
ism into the schools.
The court held that there was a governmental establishment of
religion and issued an injunction accordingly, stating that the total
effect of all of defendant's practices was to use public school funds
'4 Ohio Misc. 257, 212 N.E.2d 833 (C.P. 1965).
2 OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 7. See note 23 infra.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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